


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# A World Affair: *Biennials, Art Fairs and The 1851 Great Exhibition*



*Why not simply posit modernity as the new historical situation, modernization as the process whereby we get there, and modernism as a reaction to that situation and that process alike, a reaction that can be aesthetic and philosophico-ideological, just as it can be negative as well as positive?*

Fredric Jameson<sup>1</sup>

This essay was developed out of texts published in *Art Papers* in 2013 and *LEAP* in 2015, with this current version presented, albeit in rougher form, at the 10th *Global Art Forum* in Dubai in March 2017, and a re-edited version appearing in issue 13 of *The Exhibist* in September 2017. Parts have been quoted in recent symposia, where I have been invited to respond to questions surrounding the politics of art through my practice as an artist, writer, editor and curator; work that is tied to an ongoing study of the so-called art world—by which I mean the art fair-biennial-museum-gallery industrial complex—as an agent operating within its field.

The purpose of this particular edit—presented with necessary corrections, expansions and reshuffles—is to introduce this study from an embodied position based on years of observation in the field, which has enabled me to further refine the text as I have travelled deeper into the art world's centre. At its heart, this essay and all the versions that have come before it, represents an ongoing and real-time attempt at understanding the contemporary art world as a world-making space, while fully participating in its processes. Two central ideas run through the writing, and my position in general. The first is Fred Inglis' assertion that the study of culture is the study of power.<sup>2</sup> The second is a conception of the art world as a rhizomatic agora in the classic sense: a place not only defined by economic exchange, but by the production, trade and negotiation of knowledge, culture and power, as mediated by the historical processes that are embedded into its world-making apparatuses.

To explain the rationale behind this pursuit, I must begin from the start. I was born in Hong Kong the year before the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed, which ensured the city's return to China in 1997 after the island was ceded to Britain in 1842 as a result of the First Opium War, a conflict that expressed the British Empire's thirst for Chinese markets, followed by the leasing of the New Territories for 99 years in 1898. On paper, I am half-British and half-Chinese: a child of empire, and a hybrid product of a violent history in which trade and imperialism form a central plotline. This condition was the subject of an issue of *LEAP* magazine that I guest edited in 2016, which considered art after identity politics in the twenty-first century, when cultural hybridity, contradiction and historical complexity have come to define people on personal and collective levels—a complexity that, as curators Anders Kreuger and Nav Haq noted, the art world is not always capable of handling, despite it being a space of transcultural exchange where hybrid bodies, often produced from colonial histories, intermingle.<sup>3</sup>

The art world is also a hybrid and contradictory product of empire. At least, this is what I will propose by weaving a spectral frame around two exhibition formats that define it on global terms—biennials and art fairs—in order to think about the historical dynamics inscribed into their forms. To do this, I want to pull back to a single event in 1851. One that many scholars have considered in relation to the phenomenon of biennialization, though less so when it comes to the art fair<sup>4</sup>—The Great Exhibition of Works and Industry of All Nations, commonly referred to as the first World's Fair.<sup>5</sup> The initiative of Queen Victoria's consort Prince Albert and Henry Cole, who was inspired by the national fairs he had seen in Paris, this was an imperial extravaganza staged at


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London's Hyde Park in the Crystal Palace, a pre-fabricated building constructed especially for the occasion from iron and glass.<sup>6</sup> Some 100,000 objects were displayed by over 15,000 contributors,<sup>7</sup> with Great Britain taking up one half of the space alongside exhibits from its colonies, and the rest of the world (including France, Austria, United States of America, Turkey and Egypt) taking the other.<sup>8</sup> The exhibition continued for around six months and attracted some six million visitors – astounding numbers facilitated by a period of transformative progress that resulted in such engineering feats as steamships that could cross the Atlantic in two weeks.<sup>9</sup> (This was, after all, the time of Isambard Kingdom Brunel.)

At the time, Prince Albert described a moment of “wonderful transition” when distances once separating “the different nations and parts of the globe” were “rapidly vanishing before the achievements of modern invention.”<sup>10</sup> This accelerated period of progress pointed towards the fulfilment of what Albert called “that great end, to which, indeed, all history points – the realization of the unity of mankind”.<sup>11</sup> The Great Exhibition consolidated this development within Britain and its Empire, and also propelled it forward. As Sally Mitchell writes, London became a metropolis after the event, in part furnished by funds the exhibition raised, which were used to acquire the land to build the Victoria and Albert Museum, the Natural History Museum and the Science Museum.<sup>12</sup> The new Houses of Parliament were built, work on the London Underground began, sewers and water pipes were laid, and department stores began to line Oxford Street, Regent Street and Piccadilly Circus. The first successful transatlantic telegraph cable was completed in 1858 – though the first attempt at a submarine telegraph link between Dover and Calais was completed in 1851, the same year as the Great Exhibition – and was followed by a more successful attempt in 1866.<sup>13</sup> Then, in 1869, the Suez Canal opened, creating faster sea routes to India and the Far East; today it is still “considered the shortest link between the east and the west.”<sup>14</sup>

Within this contextual frame, the Great Exhibition was not only emblematic of a period of industrial development and global capitalist expansion inscribed with imperial aims – it offered a soft power model through which to harness these dynamics. This was reflected in the exhibition space, where colonial strategies were enacted through means of cultural and material categorization. As historian Paul Young details, aboriginal products were “stripped of any cultural resonance and offered up ... raw”; described in terms of what they comprised, and not what they culturally signified.<sup>15</sup> The China exhibit, which had little to no participation from the Chinese, was described in one account as exhibiting the qualities of art exemplified by the early stages of civilization.<sup>16</sup> Professor Robert Rydell offers a rationale for such a decontextualized approach to other cultures when discussing the subject of Universal Expositions in the United States, which followed the template laid out by the Great Exhibition's example. “[P]rimitive” societies were “[d]epicted as resource rich and lacking the material goods the anthropologists equated with civilization,” which “had the effect of underwriting the predictions of a bountiful future for the culture of imperial abundance.”<sup>17</sup> Rydell goes on to quote historian William Appleman Williams, who saw the evolving delineation between “advanced industrial societies and the rest of the world” in these exhibitions as “central to imperialism.”<sup>18</sup>

Trade was seen as both a form of cohesion and stratification, in which supply and demand, not to mention the tiers of industrial production and consumption, became the new bonds that could not only fuse an empire together while organizing it along industrialized – and racialized – hierarchies, but also expand its boundaries further. In reflection of this intention, William Felkin, then mayor of Nottingham and ‘displayer of lace’ at the 1851 Great Exhibition, noted: “To induce



all the world to become customers and consumers would appear to be the wisdom of our country and our age."<sup>19</sup> All of which was smoke and mirrors to Marx and Engels, who called the spectacle "striking proof of the concentrated power with which modern large-scale industry is everywhere demolishing national barriers and increasingly blurring local peculiarities of production, society and national character among all peoples."<sup>20</sup> Later, in an 1853 *New York Daily Tribune* dispatch, Marx would reflect on the British impact on India in a way that recalled the processes of reduction that took place within the Great Exhibition, accusing England of "breaking down the entire framework of Indian society... not so much through the brutal interference of the British tax-gatherer and the British soldier, as to the working of English steam and English free trade."<sup>21</sup>

In this light, the Great Exhibition was a weaponized space, in which culture and industry were instrumentalized to enact the economic violence of an industrialized trading power with aspirations of global dominance. It was also a political act of social engineering: a regulatory spectacle, in which national and colonial identities were ultimately constructed through the frame of empire. The Great Exhibition's supposed message of capitalist unity was self-serving, in that it offered a counterpoint to the events taking place within Britain and throughout Europe at the time, including the working-class Chartist movement, the European revolutions of 1848, and the publication of Marx and Engel's *Communist Manifesto* that same year, which not only raised concerns about the future of capitalism, but of imperial power. Reflecting the political atmosphere of the times, the organizing committee included, as *The Times* noted, "every shade of political opinion in the country"<sup>22</sup> and after 24 May, the fair (which opened on 1 May) admitted all classes into the halls.<sup>23</sup> The exhibition even appeared to embrace the revolutionary mantra of the period by filtering it through its branding, offering an example of how capitalism successfully absorbs its discontents. One statement, made in January 1851 by *The Times*, proclaimed how the event would "open men's eyes with what may be done and what will be done with the means in our possession."<sup>24</sup>

So, the World's Fair was never a world's fair. It was an imperial marketplace, an engine of modernity, and an apparatus of security: designed to not only assert an imperial—or sovereign—power, but also to mediate, manage and shape the world through that power's designated narrative. As Stuart Murray writes: "By 1855 every nation with colonial possessions wanted to display both the economic potential and the exotic difference of their empires. In part, this clearly aimed to reveal the benefits of imperial tenure, validating and legitimizing the colonial process."<sup>25</sup> On the subject of turn-of-the-century international fairs in America—"developed as organized responses to class conflict in the aftermath of industrial depressions that occurred... between 1873 and the onset of the First World War"—Rydell observes a worldview that demanded an acceptance of "empire as a way of life."<sup>26</sup> In short: "[T]he commodity fetish became an imperial fetish as well."<sup>27</sup>

The same racial hierarchies as those demonstrated in the 1851 Exhibition also abounded in the USA. "Beginning with the 1893 Chicago World's Columbian Exposition"<sup>28</sup>—which Tolstoy called "a striking example of imprudence and hypocrisy", albeit "with noble aims ascribed to it"<sup>29</sup>—"every American fair held through World War I included ethnological villages," writes Rydell.<sup>30</sup> This gave "millions of Americans first-hand experience with treating non-whites around the world as"—decontextualized—"commodities."<sup>31</sup> The 1904 St. Louis World's Fair celebrated the centennial of the Louisiana Purchase, the acquisition of said territory from France by the USA in 1803. It featured a live exhibition of Filipinos: a "celebration" of the recent annexation of the Philippines by the USA following the Spanish-American War.<sup>32</sup> The overtly imperial tone of the St. Louis World's Fair—dubbed "the largest and finest colonial exhibit ever made by any government" by one of

it organizers<sup>33</sup>—adds a dark shadow to the words its president, David Rowland Francis, used to inaugurate the event: “open ye gates! Swing wide, ye portals! Enter herein ye sons of men and behold the achievements of your race.”<sup>34</sup> Be open, be worldly: but under a sovereign power’s conditions. Sharing thus becomes conforming to an inherently discriminatory system while propagating it in turn.

Indeed, on the subject of the Crystal Palace, philosopher and cultural theorist Peter Sloterdijk finds “a new aesthetics of immersion” that “began its triumphal march through modernity” from the moment of its construction.<sup>35</sup> The Crystal Palace, “an emblem for the final ambitions of modernity,” was “a valid prophetic building form of the nineteenth century (which was immediately copied all over the world)” that “already anticipated an integral, experience-oriented, popular capitalism in which no less than the comprehensive absorption of the outside world in a fully calculated interior was at stake.”<sup>36</sup> Citing Dostoyevsky’s 1864 text *Notes from Underground*, in Sloterdijk describes a “palace of civilization” that “symbolized the will of the Western branch of humanity to conclude the initiative it had started—to make the world happy and achieve mutual understanding between peoples.”<sup>37</sup> Yet, after Dostoyevsky’s deportation to Siberia, which acquainted him with life in a “house of the dead” — “the prospect of a closed house of life now revealed itself” — “biopolitics begins as enclosure building.”<sup>38</sup> It is at this junction that Sloterdijk makes the astute observation that the Crystal Palace-as-metaphor restates “the oft-noted and oft-denied symmetry between the capitalist and socialist programmes: the socialist-communist project was simply the second building site of the palace project.”<sup>39</sup> (As I have pointed out elsewhere, just think of the slogan for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, “One World, One Dream” and China’s neo-colonial aspirations currently being enacted through its Belt and Road Project.)

This brings me to theorist Dan Smith’s summary of the 1851 Great Exhibition. Smith argues that the event “helped forge Western modernity’s formations of display, spectacle, surveillance and commodity” and “determine the form of the modern museum and gallery as well as spaces of commerce, denying any possibility of conceptually separating these sites.”<sup>40</sup> Smith aligns this assertion with sociological historian Tony Bennett’s description of “the exhibitionary complex” — “an arrangement of institutional forms that are museological but also encompass modes of public spectacle, and sites of commodity arrangement and exchange.”<sup>41</sup>

Biennials and art fairs are forms in the art world’s own exhibitionary complex, whose DNA seems unmistakably connected to the World’s Fair. Take *Kunstmarkt Köln*, the first modern art fair that started it all in 1967 when it was launched for the purposes of creating an art market from a post-war recession — what was then seen as a radically new exhibition form that was quickly copied. Or consider *Art Basel*, the second modern art fair to establish itself in 1970, which now operates as a global network across three continents: the Americas, Asia and Europe, and which has spawned scores of other fairs that seek to emulate its effects. Art historian Pamela Lee has noted how biennials have “come to stand as a country’s cultural point of entry into [a] global economy” and art fairs could be described in the same way.<sup>42</sup> These two exhibition formats represent replicable and replicated display models that have proliferated around the world to produce nodes in a transglobal network bound by art and culture: nodes that connects galleries, museums, cultural institutions and other such organizations—be they public, private, non-profit or artist-led—not to mention the agents who populate and circulate the field. As academics Anthony Gardner and Charles Green write, “The historical basis for such networks” — in this case, “the networked semi-coordination of biennials” and art fairs—“was the Romantic-era paradigm of the World Exposition, as many scholars have



noted, and behind that the even earlier vogue for the Grand Tour.”<sup>43</sup> To quote Gardner and Green on biennials while drawing art fairs into their reading, both events have the tendency to function as touristic spectacles that frame art works as “Great Exhibition marvels for visitors and political masters alike.”<sup>44</sup>

That the *Venice Biennale* was launched in 1895 as a direct result of the trend that the 1851 Great Exhibition kicked off is also telling. Like the Great Exhibition, Venice marked the birth of a very specific kind of world stage through which cultural politics and cultural economies are produced, performed, negotiated, asserted and regulated in a mediatory space. And there is a wonderful symmetry to the fact that *documenta*, a quinquennial exhibition created in Kassel in 1955 by Arnold Bode along the lines of a biennial, staged Harald Szeemann’s game-changing *documenta 5* in 1972, a large-scale thematic art show that kicked off a curatorial trend known as *Großausstellung*, or Great Exhibition, which rejected classical and academic modes of curatorial framing in favour of a conceptual, cross-disciplinary approach that organized art works around a theme, rather than a discipline. *documenta* itself was conceived as “a therapeutic agent to heal the emotional wounds” of World War II, which recalls the rhetoric of unity offered by the 1851 Great Exhibition and the world’s fair format in general.<sup>45</sup> Decades later, Szeemann curated the 2001 *Venice Biennale, Plateau of Humankind*, to reflect on the dimension of the global, stating: “We don’t wish to illustrate a style, a theme, but to offer a possible opening: to give connotation, to sustain freedom against barriers erected by styles, nationalities and nationalisms.”<sup>46</sup>



But even a ‘global space’ like the *Venice Biennale* is inscribed with clear hierarchies. Consider the representation of artists by “race and ethnicity” at the *Venice Biennale*’s 57th edition in 2017, which included a majority of “57% white” and a minority of “1% First Nations”.<sup>47</sup> Or the fact that nearly seventy-eight per cent of the exhibiting artists in Okwui Enwezor’s 2002 *documenta 11*—described as offering “an unprecedented presence of artists from outside Europe and North America”—were living in North America or Europe at the time.<sup>48</sup> Indeed, just as the 1851 Great Exhibition proclaimed its intention to unite the world and its economies in a global space, the reality of the World’s Fairs and the exhibition formats it spawned, Venice included, offers a different picture, in which historically violent cultural hierarchies remain in full view.

When entering any art fair or biennial, then, we are entering a contradictory space where an ongoing history of globalization is unfolding, in which a myriad of heightened dynamics are both at play and in conflict. Consider here the 1901 Pan-American Art Handbook for visitors, which informed its readers that when they enter the gates of the exhibition, they become part of the show.<sup>49</sup> This show sounds uncannily familiar. As Pamela Lee describes it, the contemporary art world is “both object and agent” of a market system that is inextricably linked to the processes of globalization—a process that, with the aid of technology, is charging ahead with one of the “most insidious mantras”<sup>50</sup> calling for “a ‘borderless’ world of smooth flows, unimpeded international travel, and ever-expanding networks of limitless communication.”<sup>51</sup> And those of us who engage with the art world’s networks become objects and agents in this process. Through these spaces, historical capitalism continues to



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evolve, hinged as it is on the imperializing processes of industrial modernization, not to mention a neoliberal globalism that thrives on unregulated flows within a circulatory system. Under such circumstances, to borrow Paul Werner's words, "the very admiring of art becomes an adherence to a free-market ideology"<sup>52</sup> that the 1851 Great Exhibition espoused, and which continues to shape the global today – an ideology that Fredric Jameson might call a "universal market order" which speaks to the forces of homogenization so often observed in such spaces.<sup>53</sup>

But while the global sentiments behind these exhibition formats harbour a darker modernity, to borrow semiotician Walter D. Mignolo's phrase, this does not mean we should write off these spaces, either. Often opaque, an art fair could also be read as an example of an informal market, as identified by Helge Mooshammer and Peter Mortenbock: places where the conditions are made to produce "a volatile body of knowledge" that "passes between informal global structures and the subject emerging from them."<sup>54</sup> To read a biennial or art fair as a place where the image of a future global order is appearing out of a political, cultural and historical blend of objects and bodies, is to understand it as a site of transformative and active breakdown as well as a site of conflicting and contradictory formation. I have often mentioned *Art Dubai* and the *Sharjah Biennial* as cases in point; both events have exploited each exhibition platform as a site of negotiation with various publics, from local and regional to international, as a way to assert a presence on the global stage on terms that counter those offered by the Western world, albeit within a structure that has its roots in the imperial forces that the UAE liberated itself from in 1971.

Nevertheless, in these instances, we see what social scientist and geographer Doreen Massey describes as both a spatializing and globalizing of modernity's story – gestures with intentions to "rework modernity away from being the unfolding, internal story of Europe alone."<sup>55</sup> Such spatialization rejects a singular universal – in which progress is perceived as a single line of progression, or what Massey describes as a historical queue – in favour of a spatial conception of a world in which multiple trajectories co-exist, intermingle and overlap, often times in productive dissensus.<sup>56</sup> In that sense, the number of biennial and art fairs does not necessarily signify straightforward replication: rather, they represent the art world as a microcosm composed of microcosms – a site of globalization that is both colonial and decolonial; a battleground and a site of conformist cohesion at once.

There is no denying the overlaps between the World's Fair network and that of the contemporary biennial and art fair – overlaps that render these spaces complex sites of intersection, contradiction, community, and conflict. On World's Fairs and biennials, Caroline Jones has argued that both have enabled artists to challenge and subvert structures of power, with art fairs easily slotting into this reading.<sup>57</sup> At the same time, art fairs and biennials, like World's Fairs, are also spectacles that replicate and reinforce "neo-colonial flows of international commerce [and] politics"<sup>58</sup> that, to borrow Professor George Yudice's observation on biennialization in the Americas, offer "expedient means to support the political and corporate interests of their sponsors."<sup>59</sup> The complexities of both contemporary exhibition formats bring to mind Gardner and Green's description of Okwui Enwezor's *documenta 11*, which they saw as mirroring *documenta's* original intention "to connect postwar Germany with the rest of Cold War Europe" by seeking to reconnect the Global North and South in a twenty-first-century iteration of the show.<sup>60</sup> Considering the cross-hatching dynamics that filled the space of Enwezor's 2002 exhibition, Gardner and Green used the word entanglement, not difference.<sup>61</sup> That is to say: no binaries but overlaps, intersections, knots, and threads.

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This condition is perhaps the main reason why art fairs and biennials represent a fascinating landscape of study when it comes to observing how “the standardization projected by capitalist globalization”<sup>62</sup>—of which the end goal appears to be full global union—is crafted, and in turn, crafts its subjects. As spatial and organizational forms representing a wider network of intricate and localized infrastructures, art fairs and biennials facilitate a highly contradictory process of globalization precisely because they operate within a historical system of global production and exchange—one that has produced contradictory spaces and subjects which, returning to where this essay began, look very much like my own.

This text is a precursor to ‘Now Where? On Navigating Without a Compass,’ published in the previous issue of *di'van | A Journal of Accounts* 4, 2018 (pp. 32-45). Both essays form part of a trilogy, with the third instalment, on decolonial practice, to be published in 2019.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Fredric Jameson, *A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present*, London and New York: Verso, 2002, p. 99

<sup>2</sup> Fred Inglis, *Cultural Studies*, Oxford & Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1993, p. 185

<sup>3</sup> Anders Kreuger and Nav Haq, Introduction to the exhibition *Don't You Know Who I Am? Art After Identity Politics*, at M HKA, Museum of Contemporary Art, Antwerp, 2014; <http://afteridentity.muhka.be/about>

<sup>4</sup> Although Chrisitan Morgner has explored a different—though related—genealogy of the art fair through the history of religious and artisanal festivals, in ‘The Evolution of the Art Fair’, *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (149), *Special Issue: Terrorism, Gender, and History. State of Research, Concepts, Case Studies*, 2014, pp. 318-336; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24146123>. Morgner made reference to Paco Barragán's 2008 book *The Art Fair Age*, with Barragán publishing a book in 2019, *From Roman Feria to Global Art Fair, From Grand Tour to Neo-liberal Biennial: On the 'Biennialization' of Art Fairs and the 'Fairization' of Biennials*, which includes the World's Fair in the art fair's genealogy

<sup>5</sup> As Morna Daniels writes on the tradition of exhibitions in France, “The series of the great exhibitions of the nineteenth century began in the seventeenth century, with exhibitions of works of art. These were held biannually from 1667 to 1793, with the exception of 1677, 1679 and 1708 to 1725. From 1793 to 1802 they were annual, before reverting to a biannual pattern under the Empire. Four were held in the reign of Louis XVIII and one under Charles X; under Louis-Philippe they were annual.” In ‘Paris National and International Exhibitions from 1798 to 1900: A Finding-List of British Library Holdings’, *Electronic British Library Journal (EBLJ)*, 2013; <https://www.bl.uk/ebj/2013articles/pdf/ebjarticle62013.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> See ‘Building the Museum’, Victoria and Albert Museum website; <https://www.vam.ac.uk/articles/building-the-museum>

<sup>7</sup> Liza Picard, ‘The Great Exhibition’, The British Library, published online 14 October 14, 2009; <https://www.bl.uk/victorian-britain/articles/the-great-exhibition>

<sup>8</sup> “Of foreign contributions to the Exhibition France will be the largest contributor; next to it will come the Zoolverein [Northern Germany] and Austria; then Belgium. To these succeed Russia, Turkey and Switzerland. Holland, its commercial importance considered, will occupy a very small space... Egypt, Spain, Portugal, the Brazils and Mexico, have confined themselves within still narrower limits; and China, Arabia and Persia have the smallest. Of the British dependencies the East Indies claim the lion's share of the room...” Extract from a specially written handbook by R. Beasland that was published as a guide and souvenir for prospective visitors to the 1851 Exhibition, as quoted on the Victoria and Albert Museum website; <http://www.vam.ac.uk/content/articles/t/the-displays-and-products-from-overseas>. See also Stuart Murray, ‘Canadian Representation at the 1851 London Great Exhibition and the 1855 Paris Exposition Universelle’, *Historie Sociale*, 32: 63, 2001, p. 15. “The Canadian exhibit was located on the Ground Floor, close to the crystal fountain and statue of Victoria. It took its place with other British colonies, being surrounded by exhibits from Africa, India, and the Caribbean, all contained within the western half of the huge building devoted to Britain and her Empire, while the eastern half accommodated the displays of other nations.”

<sup>9</sup> See ‘Steam & Speed: The Power of Steam at Sea’, Victoria and Albert Museum website; <http://www.vam.ac.uk/content/articles/s/the-power-of-steam-at-sea>

<sup>10</sup> Jeffrey Auerbach, *The Great Exhibition of 1851: A Nation on Display*, New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1999, p. 60

<sup>11</sup> See Jeffrey Auerbach, or Geoffrey Cantor, *Religion and the Great Exhibition of 1851*, Oxford and New York: Oxford, University Press 2011, p. 175

<sup>12</sup> See Sally Mitchell, *Daily Life in Victorian England*, Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1996, p. 8

- <sup>13</sup> The institution of Engineering and Technology; <http://www.theiet.org/resources/library/archives/featured/trans-cable1865.cfm>
- <sup>14</sup> See 'About' on the official Suez Canal Authority website; <https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/About/Pages/WhySuezCanal.aspx>
- <sup>15</sup> Paul Young, 'Mission Impossible: Globalization and the Great Exhibition', *Britain, the Empire, and the World at the Great Exhibition of 1851*, Jeffery Auerbach and Peter Hoffenberg eds, Aldershot: Asghate Publishing, 2008, p. 16
- <sup>16</sup> As Francesca Vanke writes, "A new emperor, Hsien-feng, had ascended the throne of China in 1850. He took a determinedly anti-foreign line, particularly towards the British, and was resolved to cooperate with them as little as possible." Francesca Vanke, 'Degrees of Otherness: The Ottoman Empire and China at the Great Exhibition of 1851', *Britain, the Empire, and the World at the Great Exhibition of 1851*, op cit., p. 201
- <sup>17</sup> Robert Rydell, *World of Fairs: The Century-of-Progress Expositions*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 21
- <sup>18</sup> *ibid.*, p. 22
- <sup>19</sup> As quoted by Young, 'Mission Impossible: Globalization and the Great Exhibition', op cit., p. 18
- <sup>20</sup> "By putting on show the massed resources of modern industry in a small concentrated space, just at a time when modern bourgeois society is being undermined from all sides, it is also displaying materials which have been produced, and are still being produced day after day in these turbulent times, for the construction of a new society. With this exhibition, the bourgeoisie of the world has erected in the modern Rome its Pantheon, where, with self-satisfied pride, it exhibits the gods which it has made for itself. It thus gives a practical proof of the fact that the 'impotence and vexation of the citizen' which German ideologists preach about year in year out, is only these gentlemen's own impotent failure to understand the modern movement, and their own vexation at this impotence." As quoted by Kevin Hetherington in *Capitalism's Eye: Cultural Spaces of the Commodity*, London: Routledge, 2014, p. 14
- <sup>21</sup> Karl Marx, 'The British Rule in India', first published in *New York Daily Tribune*, 25 June, 1853; <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/06/25.htm>
- <sup>22</sup> Jeffrey Auerbach, *The Great Exhibition of 1851: A Nation on Display*, op cit., p. 29
- <sup>23</sup> Liza Picard, 'The Great Exhibition', op cit.
- <sup>24</sup> As quoted by Young, op cit., p. 15
- <sup>25</sup> Murray, 'Canadian Representation at the 1851 London Great Exhibition and the 1855 Paris Exposition Universelle', op cit., p. 17
- <sup>26</sup> Rydell, *World of Fairs: The Century-of-Progress Expositions*, op cit., p. 18
- <sup>27</sup> *ibid.*, p. 22
- <sup>28</sup> *ibid.*, p. 21
- <sup>29</sup> As quoted by Rydell, *ibid.*, p. 15
- <sup>30</sup> Rydell, *ibid.*, p. 21
- <sup>31</sup> *ibid.*, p. 22
- <sup>32</sup> Greg Allen, 'Living Exhibits at the 1904 World's Fair', NPR, published May 2004; <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1909651>. See also Sharon Delmendo, *The Star-entangled Banner: One Hundred Years of America in the Philippines*, Manila: University of Philippines Press, 2005, p. 51
- <sup>33</sup> As quoted by Rydell, op cit., p. 20
- <sup>34</sup> Joe Sonderman and Mike Truax, *St. Louis: The 1904 World's Fair*, Mount Pleasant SC: Arcadia Publishing, 2008, p. 18
- <sup>35</sup> Peter Sloterdijk, *The Interior World of Capital*, Wieland Hoban trans., Cambridge UK: Polity Press, 2014, p. 169
- <sup>36</sup> *ibid.*, p. 175
- <sup>37</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>38</sup> *ibid.*

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<sup>39</sup> *ibid.*, p. 176

<sup>40</sup> Dan Smith, *Traces of Modernity*, London and New York: Verso, 2012; E-Reader Version courtesy of Kindle (location page undefined)]

<sup>41</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> Pamela Lee, *Forgetting the Art World*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2012, p. 14

<sup>43</sup> Anthony Gardner and Charles Green, *Biennials, Triennials, and documentas: The Exhibitions That Created Contemporary Art*, Hoboken NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2016, pp. 241-242

<sup>44</sup> *ibid.*, p. 242

<sup>45</sup> Abassin Nassar, 'dOCUMENTA (13) in Kabul, Bamiyan, and Kassel: A Synergy of Art and Politics', in *Keeping History Alive: Safeguarding Cultural Heritage in Post-Conflict Afghanistan*, Brendan Nassar and Sara Noshadi eds, Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 2015, p. 148

<sup>46</sup> See Kaldor Public Art Projects Education Notes; [http://kaldorartprojects.org.au/\\_assets/download-kits/2.%20Kaldornotes\\_Szeemann.pdf](http://kaldorartprojects.org.au/_assets/download-kits/2.%20Kaldornotes_Szeemann.pdf)

<sup>47</sup> Artsy Editorial, 'Venice Biennale Artists by the Numbers', 3 May 2017; <https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-venice-biennale-artists-numbers>. I have quoted these numbers in my editorial for *Ibraaz Platform* 010, 'Now Where? On Navigating without a Compass' published online on 1 August, 2017; <http://www.ibraaz.org/essays/177>, which was also published in *di'van | A Journal of Accounts*, Issue 4, 2018, pp. 32-45

<sup>48</sup> Wu Chin-Tao, 'Biennials Without Borders?' *Tate Papers*, Issue 12; [http://www.tate.org.uk/research/publications/tate-papers/12/biennials-without-borders#footnoteref7\\_toslpno](http://www.tate.org.uk/research/publications/tate-papers/12/biennials-without-borders#footnoteref7_toslpno)>

<sup>49</sup> Alison Griffiths, *Wondrous Difference: Cinema, Anthropology, and Turn-of-the-Century Visual Culture*, New York NY: Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 74

<sup>50</sup> Lee, *Forgetting the Art World*, *op cit.*, p. 14

<sup>51</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> Paul Werner, *Museum, INC: Inside the Global Art World*, Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2005, p. 20

<sup>53</sup> Jameson, *A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present*, *op cit.*, p. 13

<sup>54</sup> Helge Mooshammer and Peter Mortenbock, 'Trading Places', *Networked Cultures*, Rotterdam: Nai Publishers, 2008, p. 156

<sup>55</sup> Doreen Massey, *For Space*, London: SAGE Publications, 2005, p. 63

<sup>56</sup> *ibid.*, p. 69

<sup>57</sup> See Caroline Jones, *The Global Work of Art*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016, and Gardner and Green, *op cit.*, p. 4, 242

<sup>58</sup> Gardner and Green, *op cit.*, p. 3

<sup>59</sup> *ibid.*, p. 4

<sup>60</sup> *ibid.*, p. 188

<sup>61</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> Jameson, *A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present*, *op cit.*, p. 12

