

JACOB DREYER



# Global China: *‘With Universal Characteristics’*

*The realm of freedom... begins only where labour... determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases.*<sup>1</sup>

## LOSING A PASSPORT IN BEIJING SOUTH RAILWAY STATION

What does it mean for the universal spirit—what Hegel called the *“Weltgeist”*—to move from the West to China? In the context of the supposed collapse of political liberalism in the United States of America and an atmosphere of high tension, not to mention propaganda about how China is polluted, Orwellian, and undermining the civilisational foundations of the West, why would any humans or cultural institutions leave there for China? As an American intellectual living in Shanghai, my economic wellbeing is directly related to disseminating the ideas developed by philosophers and economists who work for this totalitarian state. I benefit in access to opportunities and capital by my existence here, specifically those that people doing the same function that I do, in quasi-democratic societies such as the USA or United Kingdom, do not. In China, the land of philosopher kings, I work in publishing—there are fine hotels, travel, relationships, and friendships that have come into my life. I’ve been elevated to some sort of minor aristocratic post within this society that remains deeply feudal. My role as an intellectual in a society that elevates discourse and writing to a politically significant role has granted me access to experiences and knowledge that I would never have in the USA.

Nonetheless, I periodically indulge in narcissistic episodes of guilty conscience; on one recent such episode, I took my brooding to Beijing’s Beihai Park. The frozen lake reminded me of the mental landscapes of ‘pure land’ Buddhism (in which one abandons the self as a compound of desire and anger); later that same day, I went to the National Art Museum of China which was showing some African masks. I reflected that Chinese investments in Africa, sometime characterised as colonial, must necessarily be accompanied by such exhibitions; the economic base is articulated by the cultural superstructure in a closed circuit that gathers energy and capital to run back and forth, stroking certain privileged persons with warmth along the way. In fairness, I found the exhibition to be very good, and was impressed that on a Saturday morning the museum was filled with schoolchildren sketching the masks, which were presented respectfully, exactly as Chinese relics are, if not more attractively. (For example, the exhibition was much superior to the one of Chinese relics in the provincial museum of Sichuan, which I saw in December 2018; better attended, better lit, better taken care of).

In truth, though, as I speak to Chinese citizens who work in media or academia, I’ve become aware that although these sectors are privileged, many of the specific entitlements which are mine are intrinsic to my American passport. The Chinese have no choice, really; their wages and ability to negotiate conditions proceed accordingly, as a caged bird to its owner; for example, the condition



of working in culture is residing in Beijing and accepting the power of the government that is there. They are not able, as I am, to float from place to place, from Beijing to New York to London at will. But, as a bird that lives in a cage perpetually open by choice, and because I enjoy the food which is regularly dispensed (the food I get is better), the owner wouldn't want me to fly out to look for berries in the wild. My salary is higher than equivalent Chinese workers, I am treated with great respect by significant Chinese thinkers with links to the government and policy system, in a way that is neither true of my American colleagues in America, nor of my Chinese colleagues in China. While it would appear that I am comparatively free, such freedom is entirely the product of my passport, and the military and economic power upon which that rests. Because of this, I discuss with agitation the conditions in Chinese prison camps while sitting in fine restaurants in the capital, rather than ever being worried about being placed in such centres. I am not sure what exactly I should do about this, but doing nothing is implicit acceptance and to a degree, complicity with the power structure, or rather, structures—oppressive economic and political hierarchies exist in the USA as well as in China—and my good fortune is largely the result of causing the two to coincide in a fruitful way.

In the Beijing South Railway Station, before boarding my train, I discovered that I couldn't find my passport. I was immediately plunged into great anxiety: would I have to somehow stay in Beijing? Would I find my passport or get a new one in time for a trip to Vietnam planned in a few days? Abruptly, I experienced the horror which many Chinese friends of mine must have encountered; yes, the Starbucks is still there, my money and nice shirts still there, the girl in Shanghai I have a crush on is still there, every privilege of the warm and beautiful cage was unchanged, but the cage door has been slammed shut, in my mind, if only for a thankfully brief moment. If I was thrown into such disarray by being possibly unable to take a vacation due to my own incompetence, how must it feel to be a Chinese intellectual who, as a musician in Wuhan sadly told me, "was born in the wrong country"?

I did not find my passport, but the station attendants searched their computer system and put me on the train regardless—another instance in which China's information and surveillance system has benefited, rather than disadvantaged me. (If my passport were to be located it would be entirely thanks to CCTV cameras, police officers, and citizens, the latter forced to become 'good Samaritans' because of China's pervasive social credit system). As I sped through barren fields and smokestacks, sitting in a comfortable fast train, my momentary discombobulation resulted in a feeling of nervousness, agitation—flushed—in the way that the romantic heroes of nineteenth century literature—Stendahl's Julien Sorel, for example, or Lermontov's Pechorin—might have; but in the twenty-first century romantic heroes do not fight 'the world', but themselves, as mediated by their passports and their mobile phones. I knew that my passport, that battered trinket filled with optimistic lies about the freedom that supposedly exists in America, was sadly languishing in a coffee shop bathroom or some place like that. I could only hope that somehow, the omnipotent Chinese state would return my passport to me in Shanghai. This God comes with a sword, for the migrant workers which it evicts, the Muslims it incarcerates, or the intellectuals it stifles. But for me it's likely to correct my mistakes—as an artificial intelligence is meant to—and, hopefully, locate my passport with a CCTV camera, deliver it via a synchronised urban computer system, and send it to me by way of a man working for low wages as a motorcycle deliveryman.

JACOB DREYER



#### ASIA: A PROPHECY

For several hundred years, the English-speaking middle class, in search of validation and reassurance, has pretended that its civilisation is a universal one, and created institutions to match—banks, universities, museums and opium trading companies. It was a nice run while it lasted, but now it's over. The subjectivity it thinks of as 'universal', locating it in both time (modern) and space (global) is actually reflective of economic structures that emerged in England in early modernity. Capitalism divided a collective and religious English-speaking people into individual units, even as (with enclosures and the nascent property system) it divided the land. England's best minds of that time devised landscape painting (Turner), poetry (Blake) or aesthetic critique (Ruskin) that reflected several things; one, that the subject capable of expressing 'universal art' is not universal, but specifically located in time, space and economic structures; two, that within even that time, space etc., it is a minority position, its status not quite ruling class but above working class—they called this "middle class". Bourgeois art and the British Empire were created by slave labour and land enclosures (as Marx explains in *Das Kapital*, in his chapter on primitive accumulation), and the sinews and articulation points of our art history—painters, thinkers, writers, even central London itself, or settlements from Virginia to New South Wales—the latter a society (of people who thought of themselves as English) which could have collapsed inwards in revolution, or collapsed outwards into a global empire.

Our term for the path to universal consciousness, for the apprehension and experience of all things, is "economy", from the Greek "*oikonomia*", a portmanteau word combining "*oikos*" (household) and "*nemein*" (management), but our 'homeland' has become claustrophobic and void of emotional content; there's not enough room for our existence and illusions to coexist on planet earth anymore. London and New York, as well as the provincial capitals, once were exciting, free spaces filled with imagined futures. Today, they are oppressive terrains that we circle around, in a predatory, culturally cannibalistic spiral of rearticulating and reappropriating previously made statements, rather than iterating anything new. It is important to recognise that the problems Western societies are currently experiencing reflect very real ecological and material realities; we've had our fun, but the neighbors hate us now; our conflation of universal values and military conquests worked for a while, until it didn't anymore. Taking the broad view, our historical role as colonial administrators, from British trading house Jardine Matheson, to the biochemist, historian and sinologist Joseph Needham, to the officers of the Chinese Maritime Customs, has been an unlatching of the door for the Chinese people to enter a new plateau of consciousness—from our brief time in the centre, we are headed back to the periphery. Marxist thought, the child of the British Library, has found a powerful adulthood in China. What is the psychic experience of dislocation for English native speakers who are more or less realistic about the history of its civilisation, and how will contemporary artists iterate these phenomena? Will the middle class, sorry, 'universal subjectivity', relocate to China? "In the beginning, all the world was America," John Locke wrote in *Two Treatises of Government*, in 1689. In the end, it's going to be Shenzhen.

#### THE PANOPTICON VERSUS NEW SOUTH WALES

The Chinese have had many experiences of nomadic clans invading them, such as the Mongolians and the Manchurians, and slowly, insidiously, being integrated into their superior way of life. In his paranoid memoir *The Ugly Chinaman* (1992), poet, essayist and historian Bo Yang wrote that Chinese culture, which he called a "stinking soy sauce vat," with its fleshpots and shining lights, would

inevitably integrate any attempt to suppress it, like the vines of a plant growing disruptively over structures intended to enclose it. The agricultural and sedentary civilisation founded by the Yellow Emperor (c. 2711-2598 BCE) and his engineer Da Yu can be conquered, but it's paradoxically unconquerable, as it integrates everything it meets into Chinese civilisational logic. There's no reason to think that our rootless global civilisation, which lives in the shell made by the British Empire — Hong Kong, Shanghai, London, Australia, British Polo Day — will be any different. The nomads (both the Mongol hordes and the English), have no history; they only have a geography. Former English colonies such as Virginia, New South Wales, or even Singapore today face a contradiction in which the material base of the lifestyles the inhabitants expect might only be granted by the Chinese economy and the comfortable vassalage that it offers. The logic of the global economy and its permanent expansion means that we need the Chinese population more than the Chinese state needs us, and so it seems inevitable that we'll sacrifice some of our sovereignty in order to access China. At Sydney's White Rabbit Gallery, a private museum which exhibits its collection of contemporary Chinese art, democratic subjects of Australia can observe the horrors of China, but the ecological destruction they see, the vast new cities and the money generated, was made from Australian iron ore, and much of that money has been invested in Sydney real estate.

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The historical processes by which the people of a small European island spread around the world was arduous, replete with war and conflict, the ruling class constantly evading revolutionary change. With 'the people' at its backs, it confidently strode through jungles and deserts, subjugating the inhabitants it met into its own civilisational logic by way of creating ownership of their societies. In 1992, with Anglo-Saxon social forms of capitalist democracy globally dominant, we 'arrived' at "the end of history",<sup>2</sup> but some of us felt that history — ours, and that of other people, the love affairs doomed to failure, the lunches by the waterfront, the stimulation of the unknown — was more intriguing than the suburban safety in which we ended up, a place of unremitting ugliness, aesthetic and human. We'd travelled everywhere, done everything, or so it seemed, but wherever we went, we found ourselves — and the boredom and despair of sitting quietly in a room by ourselves greeting us everywhere — at the end of history, our victory was hollow indeed, and the lords of our economy at that time set to hollowing out the category "middle class". The colonial administrators, no longer needed, began to revert to proletarian status.

Few would say, in retrospect, that history really ended in 1992; the 1990s were more of a pause, albeit certainly not for the Chinese. Some of us, including myself, had left our suburban homelands in search of adventure, in China for example; others were wandering around those suburbs committing random acts of violence. Both attitudes are, more or less, traditional to the naval authoritarian heritage of the British Empire. The "*Dasein*" (existence) of the Anglo-Saxons, as the Germans bitterly observed, was a naval one;<sup>3</sup> the world we discovered around us when we came to consciousness, or Heidegger's "*Thrownness*" (*Geworfenheit*), was a sometimes frightening, sometimes exciting set of warm continents surrounded by water, and a homeland where it rained every day and an oppressive class structure that made life predictably miserable; on the ships which the homeland sent out, floggings and rape were routine; as they would be for the 'natives' we encountered. Peace, harmony; we've never had much use for that sort of thing. We no longer call it an Empire, but rather a "global economy" — although the format hasn't changed much.





During the initial settlement of Australia, philosopher and social reformer Jeremy Bentham argued in *Panopticon versus New South Wales* (1812), that colonial expansion simply postponed the reckoning with the dispossessed that the English had seen in the Gordon Riots in London in 1780,<sup>4</sup> and watched what took place in pre-Revolutionary France with its financial crisis shortly after. For Bentham, a system of mass surveillance and control was necessary; if they just told these people to go somewhere else, eventually the ruling class would run out of somewhere-elses. Bentham was ignored, but today, that frontier has not only been terminated, it is actively receding, as the changing climate threatens our cities. An alarming consideration is that the Chinese seem to have achieved in twenty years what took the West two hundred years, and have continued at the same tempo, technically placing them in our future. The globalised, relatively ecologically sustainable albeit polluted, authoritarian system run partially by algorithm, created for their population and that of new vassal states is, if anything, a best case situation for the English-speaking world's future (consider for example, the USSR during the process of its collapse: corruption, despoiled rural areas, falling life expectancy, allies flaking away).

#### F.I.L.T.H.

For centuries, the Western colonisation of Asia's economy was conducted in English, Chinese, and above all in numbers, of populations, prices of homes or land, bank accounts and opium addicts. Ultimately, the goal of this universal economy is a quest for agency, a total control of one's environment and the persons (subjects) one encounters there—a subjectivity which is sufficiently enhanced as to become objectivity.

F.I.L.T.H: Failed-In-London-Try-Hong Kong. This 1980s joke could be a shorthand for the collective economic strategy of the West, post-Thatcher. The best and brightest—as well as the worst—were exported as colonials; all in late capitalism's gutter, but some looking at the stars. For these universal sorts, life felt meaningless beyond the power hierarchy. Freedom engenders anxiety for the colonial/expatriate soul. Nothing new, of course: the history of English-speaking people is a history of running away from themselves. In China, it has been confronted by a mass impossible to presume to be 'us', and which, partly due to not believing their own rhetoric as thoroughly as we do, seems not to care about our noble lies about poverty alleviation in Africa, climate change, the idea that whichever novel won the Booker Prize this year is actually readable, and so forth. They simply get on with building metro systems in Ethiopia, inventing 5G networks that can be installed cheaply in developing countries, and reckoning with the issues of climate change as the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases. We can't digest them, and they can't digest us; romantic souls might say that we've finally met our match.

#### BETWEEN THE WARS

In 2019, it seems clear that ideological conflict between the USA and China will define global politics for years to come, with countries and individuals in Europe, Asia and the rest of the world finding their own ways to respond. For Westerners who identify as cosmopolitan, global citizens, it is disconcerting to have the foundations of one's home nation appear to have experienced a fundamental transformation.

Cultural institutions and the discourse of art aspire to be 'universal', yet in practice, human hierarchies structure these institutions. For example, although the university, the museum, or the financial market seek in different ways to organise all the world's knowledge, art or money, they are still physically located in one city or another, and the landlords and populations adjacent benefit accordingly. In the decade since the financial crisis of 2008, during which the Chinese Keynesian stimulus of debt-driven infrastructure was widely applauded as more effective than Western austerity, Western cultural institutions that understand themselves as universal have opened franchises in Chinese cities, notably Shanghai's West Bund, with financial incentives offered by the Chinese government; around Rmb20 billion (about US\$3 billion) has already been invested in turning the former industrial area into a "cultural corridor" on the Huangpu River. Chinese cities seem to be attracting the type of populations and institutions which call themselves global but are doing so with nationalist goals in mind; perhaps the globalists were just economic mercenaries all along, and some are starting to change sides.

New York University Shanghai, for example, has had 51% of its operational budget regularly supplied by the Chinese government, with real responsibilities to the funding bodies.<sup>5</sup> "NYU Shanghai is a Chinese university," highlighted Chancellor Yu Lizhong.<sup>6</sup> But what does this mean? The Centre Pompidou, currently undergoing a 100 million euro renovation, signed a deal to open a Shanghai venue at the same time as President Macron announced that China would buy French airplanes, relax tariffs on French beef, and open a nuclear waste treatment facility operated by French Avena;<sup>7</sup> and the Victoria and Albert Museum is working towards a franchise of sorts in Shenzhen, lured by undisclosed amounts of money and access to the Chinese 'public' in and out of China. "We want the V&A brand in front of the biggest audience we can think of," said Tim Reeve, the Museum's Deputy Director. "And if that means more Chinese visitors in South Kensington (the Museum's London address)—great. It's important for the UK."<sup>8</sup> It has been exclusively developed by China Merchants Shekou Holding (CMSK), a division of China Merchants Group, which is state-owned but based in Hong Kong. Universities and museums inside and outside China find the highly educated, culturally sophisticated and financially well-off Chinese middle class an irresistible target; but this class is structured by, and loyal to, the Chinese government. *He who pays the piper calls the tune*. This need not be sinister, but some clearly feel so, with large sectors of the Western political and media platforms given to paranoid Kremlinology, alongside well-substantiated issues including repression of political dissent and ethnic minorities, air pollution, island-building and spying, and other familiar imperial patterns. Are foreigners who invest their time and creative capital in China on a *mission civilisatrice*, or are they useful idiots of a fascist state? "There aren't any global museums, because it's not part of the culture or the history of Asia or Latin America to create encyclopedic museums—that's a European thing," observed Michael Govan of LACMA,<sup>9</sup> which is cooperating with the West Bund's Yuz Museum in the creation of a global museum 'with Chinese characteristics'. European encyclopedic museums, such as the British Museum, or the Pergamon Museum in Berlin clearly are collections of imperial loot, the latter of which is at the centre of activist calls to "decolonise this place". Ought we therefore assume that, in decolonising Western capitals, the colonial apparatus is merely being relocated elsewhere? As long as there are economic hierarchies, it seems likely that there will be cultural ones as well; as long as there are centres, there will be peripheries.



#### AMERICA AGAINST ITSELF

What are the concrete reasons that the Chinese system has done well? Is their success simply that of authoritarianism, and in that sense, parallel to the success of the West during its expansionary centuries, which coincided with the creation of the world's great museums? "Authoritarian" and "universal" are often synonyms, without a central force, a metropolitan cogito at the centre of society (one which is articulated by institutions such as museums and universities), there are no universal norms or standards. In the West today, as cultural institutions are often divided by controversy about representations of colonial history, race and gender, the notion of the universal is being called into question. That 'universal' was in practice formed on the 'playing fields of Eton', or at Harvard University, reasons why these institutions are now targeted by decolonialist activists. The Chinese 'universal', whether that is understood to be the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese language through its global Confucius Institutes, or the new museums being built in the country, borrows crucially from the Western model. But in most cases, the Chinese state and its propensity for planning is at the centre of cultural policy. To quote Vivienne Chow from *Artsy*,

*Development of China's cultural infrastructure and creative industries has been high on the country's national agenda since the 12th five-year plan (2011-15), and the cultural sector remains one of the top priorities in the country's 13th five-year plan (2016-20). Museums play a key role in this field. According to state media Xinhua, Liu Yuzhu, director of State Administration of Cultural Heritage, revealed in May that China has 4,692 registered museums as of the end of 2015, with 1,112 of them privately owned. These museums have been staging a total of 20,000 exhibitions each year, visited by more than 700 million visitors.<sup>10</sup>*

Access to Chinese citizen-consumers is an important lure for Western institutions and individuals living through an age of austerity in their home countries; for such people, myself included, China offers a wide range of professional and personal opportunities, a life often much more rewarding than might be possible in the West. At the same time, it is difficult to dispel concerns about the structure of the Chinese government, with its well-documented past and present of repressive policies.

#### ENGINEERS OF A (UNIVERSAL) SPIRIT

It's not paranoid to suggest that intellectuals in China are required to serve the state—it has been official policy since 1941. In the 1941 Talks on Literature and Art at Yan'an, Mao Zedong laid out the principles of socialist realism in saying, "In the world today all culture, all literature and art belong to definite classes and are geared to definite political lines. There is in fact no such thing as art for art's sake, art that stands above classes, art that is detached from or independent of politics."<sup>11</sup> This logic is hardly limited to China; in his bitter 1985 book *How New York Stole Modern Art*, Parisian Serge Guilbaut grumbled about how the CIA supported abstract expressionism, allowing New York to poach the limelight from Paris as the global centre for art. Artists like Jasper Johns, Robert Rauschenberg, Andy Warhol and Robert Smithson engaged with American iconography and landscapes in a discourse that made for a peculiarly American universalism; it would have seemed provincial if it hadn't become the centre of the global economy, but in the post-war flush of its success, these artists were understood as being of global relevance. The role of the American government in disseminating its culture, even 'dissident' culture, is unquestionable; aside from basic realities (without a booming economy, there wouldn't have been money for artists), Guilbaut and

others demonstrated that culture was a key terrain for the Cold War. Similarly, high auction prices for Chinese art objects in the pre-2008 boom were often the result of bids from the Poly Auction Group, a front for the PLA;<sup>12</sup> even avant-garde artists financed by (the Hong Kong based non-profit art) K11 Foundation are clearly in a web of money and soft power connected to the Chinese ascent, which is controlled by the Communist Party. It is hard to reproach them for anything other than competence; Chinese political theorists, notably the current number five in the Politburo, Wang Huning, observed America and learned valuable lessons.

In his 1991 book *America against America*, Wang “highlights the contrasts between the world’s richest tycoons and impoverished American communities as well as between the much-touted democratic system and the ‘undemocratic’ control exercised by the special interests of capitalism.”<sup>13</sup> While the Soviet Union collapsed, due to what might be called corruption or ‘internal contradictions’, widely seen as an inspiration for Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign and neo-authoritarianism, Wang’s trip to America may have been equally influential, as he started researching corruption as a concept immediately after his visit. Writing against official corruption in the immediate wake of the Soviet collapse as well as the Tiananmen demonstrations, Wang stated “that while the West emphasises malpractice mainly in the public domain, Chinese conceptions encompass both public and private domains”<sup>14</sup> and a second book on the subject, co-edited and translated by Wang and his colleagues, was prefaced by the Chinese saying, “The stones from hills yonder can polish jade at home” or in other words, that an efficient system of government learns from the mistakes of others.<sup>15</sup> China would be America—an improved version. Shortly thereafter, Wang Huning was invited to Chinese government summits at Beidaihe to turn his theories into practice. Political scientist Jude Blanchette writes that Wang “was concerned with how the ‘reform and opening’ policies were contributing to a hollowing-out of Beijing’s control over its far-flung territories.”<sup>16</sup> Much as American neoliberal policies weakened the American state, even as they enriched individual Americans, the liberal policies of the 1990s weakened the Chinese Communist Party, even as they enriched China. By 2012, it was time to take back control, to recommence articulating a unified message; but by then, the economic base, the increasingly cosmopolitan population of the major cities, and the sophisticated knowledge economy of tech companies, universities and art practices meant that a unified China was also a ‘universal’ China, one whose message would need to have resonance around the world. As exiled poet Bei Dao wrote in defiance of Beijing’s authorities in the late 1980s,

*A new conjunction and glimmering stars  
Adorn the unobstructed sky now;  
They are the pictographs from five thousand years.  
They are the watchful eyes of future generations.*<sup>17</sup>

Notes

<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, chapter 48, ‘The Trinity Formula’; see <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ch48.htm>

<sup>2</sup> Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama argued in his 1992 book, *The End of History and the Last Man*, that the worldwide spread of liberal democracies and free market capitalism of the West, following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, signalled “not just... the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”

<sup>3</sup> Carl Schmitt, *Land and Sea: A World-Historical Meditation*, Stanford: Telos Press Publishing, Stanford University, CA, 2015. Originally published in 1942, at the height of the Second World War, *Land and Sea: A World-Historical Meditation* recounts Carl Schmitt’s view of world history “as a history of the battle of sea powers against land powers and of land powers against sea powers.” Schmitt here unfolds his view of world history from the Peloponnesian War to European colonial expansion to the birth pangs of capitalism, while polemically setting Nazi

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Germany as a continental land power against Britain and the United States as its maritime enemies. In *Land and Sea*, Schmitt offers his interpretations of the rise of Venice, piracy, "corsair capitalism", the spatial revolution of European colonial expansion, the rise of the British Empire, and his readings of thinkers as diverse as Seneca, Shakespeare, Herman Melville and Benjamin Disraeli

<sup>4</sup> The Gordon Riots of June 1780 are considered by some historians to be the closest Great Britain has ever come to a full-blown revolution. Following legislation permitting Catholics greater freedom a huge petition seeking repeal of these Acts was drawn up by the Protestant Association, under the leadership of the enigmatic Lord George Gordon. On the morning of 2 June of that year a huge crowd of nearly 50,000 people marched to parliament to present the petition. Events descended into chaos. For a week thereafter violence raged across the capital—15,000 troops poured into London to quell the disturbances and nearly 300 rioters were shot dead by soldiers

<sup>5</sup> See Yaxue Cao, 'New York University Shanghai: What is the Deal', *China Change*, 5 February 2015; <https://chinachange.org/2015/02/05/new-york-university-shanghai-what-is-the-deal/>

<sup>6</sup> See Stephanie Bailey, 'An Investigation of NYU Shanghai's Finances', *On Century Avenue*, 9 May, 2018; <http://oncenturyavenue.org/2018/05/an-investigation-of-nyu-shanghais-finances/>

<sup>7</sup> See 'Emmanuel wins numerous contracts in China', *La Croix*, 1 September, 2018; <https://www.la-croix.com/Economie/Monde/En-Chine-Emmanuel-Macron-decroche-nombreux-contrats-2018-01-09-1200904621>

<sup>8</sup> Fionnuala McHugh, 'How the Victoria and Albert Museum in China signals a new design for Shenzhen', *CNN Style*, 22 January 2018; <https://edition.cnn.com/style/article/shenzhen-vna-museum-osm/index.html>

<sup>9</sup> Nate Freeman, 'Michael Govan on LACMA's Major Expansion into China', *Artsy*, 25 March 2019; <https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-michael-govan-lacmas-major-expansion-china>

<sup>10</sup> See Vivienne Chow, 'Why London's Victoria & Albert Museum is Launching an Outpost in China', *Artsy*, 20 June 2016; <https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-why-london-s-victoria-albert-museum-is-launching-an-outpost-in-china>

<sup>11</sup> See 'Quotations from Mao Tse Tung', *Mao Tse Tung Internet Archive*; <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/red-book/ch32.htm>

<sup>12</sup> Elliott Wilson, 'China's Artefacts Come Home', *The Financial Times*, 28 May 2011; <https://www.ft.com/content/dafabaf2-6919-11df-aa7e-00144feab49a>

<sup>13</sup> 'Meet the Mastermind behind Xi Jinping's Power', *Tribune Content Agency*, 13 November 2017; <https://tribunecontentagency.com/article/meet-the-mastermind-behind-xi-jinpings-power/>

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> 'Meet the Mastermind behind Xi Jinping's Power', *Tribune Content Agency*, *op cit.*; see also Yi Wang, 'Meet the mastermind Behind Xi Jinping's Power', *The Washington Post*, 6 November 2017; [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldpost/wp/2017/11/06/wang-huning/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.0721270285f4](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldpost/wp/2017/11/06/wang-huning/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.0721270285f4)

<sup>16</sup> Jude Blanchette, 'Wang Huning's Neo-Authoritarian Dream', 20 October 2017; <http://www.judeblanchette.com/blog/2017/10/20/wang-hunings-neo-authoritarianism-dream>

<sup>17</sup> Bei Dao (Zhao Zhenkai), 'The Answer', *The August Sleepwalker*, (trans.) Bonnie S. McDougall, New York: New Directions Publishing Corporation, 1990

